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Abstract
This note reports the rate of ination that minimizes the mark-up of prices over marginal
costs in the steady-state solution of a monopolistic competition model with either Taylor
(1980) or Calvo (1983) pricing. The minimal mark-up is always found at a positive and
low rate of ination for any sensible parameter calibration. Actually, the rate of ination
that minimizes the mark-up is very close to ratio between the real rate of discount and the
Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. This result is robust to altenative sticky-price specications.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to calculate the minimal mark-up of prices over marginal costs
in economies with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. On that purpose, two types of
slow price-adjustment specications will be introduced in a standard monopolistic competition
framework: the Taylor staggered prices (original from Taylor, 1980), and the Calvo partial
adjustment based on xed probabilities (described in Calvo, 1983). Together they represent the
bulk of recent literature on optimizing models with sticky prices; the so-called New Keynesian
methodology. Examples of papers using the Calvo pricing are Yun (1996), King and Wolman
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(1996), Erceg et al. (2000), and Sbordone (2002). The Taylor pricing has been employed in
papers such as King and Wolman (1999), Chari et al. (2000), and Huang and Liu (2002).
The mark-up is recognized as a source of economic ine¢ ciency that stems from the monopo-
listic competition structure. It results in certain long-run welfare loss relative to the price-taking
behavior of perfect competition as rst pointed out by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).1 There-
fore we will search for the rate of ination that makes the mark-up minimum in steady state to
serve as a reference for a long-run monetary policy strategy.
2 Monopolistic competition and sticky prices
Let us begin with the monopolistic competition setup described in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
There is a continuum of rms each of them producing a di¤erentiated good in a monopolistically
competitive market. Thus, the rm i sets the price Pt(i) in quarter t, and the amount of output
that will sell yt(i) is giving by the Dixit-Stiglitz demand equation
yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
yt;
where  is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods, Pt is the aggregate price
level, and yt is aggregate output. Let us denote the total cost of production for rm i in quarter
t as TCt(i). Total income of rm i is Pt(i)yt(i) = Pt(i)
h
Pt(i)
Pt
i 
yt. Accordingly, the amount
of rm is prot in period t expressed in units of the Dixit-Stiglitz composite good would beh
Pt(i)
Pt
i1 
yt   TCt(i)Pt . Thus, the optimal-price decision in period t is made by maximizing the
intertemporal prot function:
Max
Pt(i)
Et
1X
j=0
j
 
Pt+j(i)
Pt+j
1 
yt+j   TCt+j(i)
Pt+j
!
(1)
where Et is the rational expectation operator in period t, and the discount factor is  = 11+
with  > 0 as the real rate of discount.
Now we will introduce price rigidities. Following Calvo (1983), let us assume that there is a
1Other papers that examine this issue are King and Wolman (1996), Khan et al. (2003), and Casares (2004).
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constant probability  that rms will not be able to change prices. This leads to the following
rst order condition resulting from (1)
Et
1X
j=0
jj
 
(1  )

Pt(i)
Pt+j
  yt+j
Pt+j
  @TCt+j(i)
@yt+j(i)
@yt+j(i)
@Pt(i)
1
Pt+j
!
= 0: (2)
Alternatively, it could be assumed that rms can adjust the price with a constant frequency as
rst proposed by Taylor (1980). In particular, rms can only adjust prices every J quarters,
remaining constant meanwhile. The rst order condition resulting from solving (1) becomes
then
Et
J 1X
j=0
j
 
(1  )

Pt(i)
Pt+j
  yt+j
Pt+j
  @TCt+j(i)
@yt+j(i)
@yt+j(i)
@Pt(i)
1
Pt+j
!
= 0: (3)
Let  t =
@TCt(i)
@yt(i)
1
Pt
denote the real marginal cost in composite-good output units.2 We are
going to insert this denition and the derivative @yt+j(i)@Pt(i) =  
h
Pt(i)
Pt+j
i  1 yt+j
Pt+j
obtained from
the Dixit-Stiglitz demand equation in the two previous equations to nd
(1  )Et
1X
j=0
jj
 
Pt(i)
Pt+j
  yt+j
Pt+j
!
=  Et
1X
j=0
jj
 
 t+j

Pt(i)
Pt+j
  1 yt+j
Pt+j
!
; (4)
(1  )Et
J 1X
j=0
j
 
Pt(i)
Pt+j
  yt+j
Pt+j
!
=  Et
J 1X
j=0
j
 
 t+j

Pt(i)
Pt+j
  1 yt+j
Pt+j
!
: (5)
Expressions (4) and (5) determine the steady-state value of the average mark-up. It can be
computed by taking into account a number of steady-state properties of these models: prices
rise at a constant rate of ination (), output is constant (y), the real marginal cost is also
constant ( ), and the rational expectation operators can be dropped. In turn, equations (4)-(5)
can be written in steady state as follows
2Assuming a production function homogeneous of degree 1 (which implies constant returns to scale), the real
marginal cost is identical across rms. This is the reason why  t is not rm specic and appears denoted without
the i index.
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(1  )
1X
j=0
jj
 
P (i)
(1 + )jP
  y
(1 + )jP
!
=   
1X
j=0
jj
 
Pt(i)
(1 + )jP
  1 y
(1 + )jP
!
;(6)
(1  )
J 1X
j=0
j
 
P (i)
(1 + )jP
  y
(1 + )jP
!
=   
J 1X
j=0
j
 
P (i)
(1 + )jP
  1 y
(1 + )jP
!
:(7)
The inverse value of the steady-state real marginal cost,   1, is the ratio of the aggregate price
level over the nominal marginal cost in steady state. It represents the average steady-state
mark-up of prices over marginal costs. Using the properties of the summation of numbers that
decrease at a constant factor, the steady-state solutions for   1 implied by (6) and (7) are
  1 =

   1
1  (1 + )( 1)
1  (1 + )

P
P (i)

; (8)
  1 =

   1
1  J(1 + )J
1  J(1 + )J( 1)
1  (1 + )( 1)
1  (1 + )

P
P (i)

: (9)
The ratio of the aggregate price level over the optimal price in steady state P=P (i) for the
Calvo pricing model is3
P
P (i)
=

1  
1  (1 + ) 1
1=(1 )
: (10)
Analogously, the steady-state ratio P=P (i) in the Taylor pricing model is4
P
P (i)
=
"
1
J
1  (1 + )J( 1)
1  (1 + )( 1)
#1=(1 )
: (11)
Hence,substituting (10) in (8) and (11) in (9) yield the following average steady state mark-up
3This result can be obtained by taking the aggregate price level denition P = [(1 )P (i)1 +P 11 ]1=(1 )
in steady state with a constant rate of ination .
4 In this case, the aggregate price level is obtained as P =
PJ 1
k=0 [J
 1P k(i)1 ]1=(1 ) where P k(i) denotes
the optimal price set k periods ago. Assuming the steady-state condition P k(i) = (1 + )P (k+1)(i) leads to
(11).
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for the Calvo pricing (12) and the Taylor pricing (13)
  1 =

   1
1  (1 + )( 1)
1  (1 + )

1  
1  (1 + ) 1
1=(1 )
; (12)
  1 =

   1
1  J(1 + )J
1  J(1 + )J( 1)
1  (1 + )( 1)
1  (1 + )
"
1
J
1  (1 + )J( 1)
1  (1 + )( 1)
#1=(1 )
: (13)
In both cases, the steady-state average mark-up   1 depends on the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity
parameter , the rate of discount  as determinant of  = 11+ , the level of price rigidities (
under Calvo pricing and J under Taylor pricing), and the steady-state rate of ination .
3 Sticky prices and the minimal mark-up in steady state
The market power that rms have in monopolistic competition drives the mark-up of prices over
marginal costs above unity. If prices were fully exible the mark-up would always be constant at
  1 =  1 . This result is obtained in the steady-state expressions (12) and (13) when assuming
exible prices ( = J = 0:0). However, it was shown in the previous section that the presence
of sticky prices á la Calvo or á la Taylor makes the value of the mark-up in steady state depend
on the rate of ination. Based on welfare grounds, it would be desirable to set a long-run target
for ination that resulted in a minimal mark-up. In that case, the long-run deviation of the
economy from the (e¢ cient) perfect competition solution would have been reduced as much as
possible. With this purpose, we will conduct an exercise of nding the steady-state rates of
ination that minimize   1 for some given model parameters , , and  (in Calvo pricing,
equation 12), and , , and J (in Taylor pricing, equation 13).
For comparative purposes, we will x the same degree of price stickiness under Calvo and
Taylor schemes (parameterized by  and J , respectively). Let Q denote the average number
of quarters without price adjustment which would represent the level of pricing rigidities. If
we notice that in Taylor model Q=J whereas in Calvo model Q=(1   ) 1, the calibration
 = [0:5; 0:75; 0:875] and J = [2; 4; 8] provides three specications for both models in which Q
is two quarters (half a year), four quarters (one year), and eight quarters (two years). These
three alternative of price rigidities are going to be examined next.
To begin with, let us assume the following baseline calibration for the other two parameters:
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 = 0:005 (which implies a 2% annual rate of discount); and  = 10:0. Figure 1 displays the
plots of   1 related to . For all the cases depicted, there is a u-shaped pattern representing
the steady-state inuence of ination over the markup. In other words, there is a minimal
markup at some (optimal) rate of ination. The left columns of Table 1 provide the numbers.
Remarkably, all the sticky-price specications give a minimal markup at a steady-state rate of
ination very close to 0.2% per year. It means that neither the Chicago rule ( 400 1+ '  2%)
nor the 0% rate of ination minimize the mark-up. The minimal mark-up is obtained at a
low positive rate of ination, very close to 0.2%. This results is robust to considering the
three di¤erent levels of price stickiness (Q=2, Q=4, and Q=8) in both Calvo pricing as well as
Taylor pricing. Therefore, the degree of price stickiness in either Calvo or Taylor models has no
inuence on determining the rate of ination in steady state that minimizes the mark-up.5 The
pricing behavior only determines the size of the welfare cost of ination. With Calvo staggered
prices the welfare losses would be clearly larger than with Taylor prices because the markup
increases much more rapidly when steady-state ination moves from its optimal value (compare
Calvo and Taylor models in Figure 1).6 In addition, the longer is the average time without
adjusting prices (Q), the larger is the welfare cost when ination deviates from the optimal rate
(see Figure 1 within Calvo and Taylor models).
A sensitivity analysis can be conducted by nding rates of ination that minimizes the mark-
up under alternative calibrations for  and . Results are reported in Table 2. When =0.01
and =10.0, the mark-up is minimized at a higher rate of ination, near 0.4%. It implies
that a rise of the real interest rate from the baseline =0.005 to =0.01 leads to a higher rate
of ination to minimize the mark-up. This is result is obtained with both Calvo and Taylor
pricing for any degree of price stickiness. The next calibration reported in Table 2 is =0.005
and =6.0: This case represents a larger monopolistic power (lower ) compared to the baseline
calibration. Remarkably, the rate of ination that makes the mark-up minimal in steady state
is again higher, close to 0.67%. As a consequence, a higher rate of discount  or a greater
monopolistic power (lower ) will result in a higher rate of ination needed to minimize the
5This seems somehow surprising because the steady-state relationships (12) and (13) include the price stickiness
parameters  and J .
6The same result has been found by Kiley (2002).
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mark-up in steady-state. Clearly, this desirable rate of ination depends on the values assigned
to  or  while it did not depend on the pricing behavior. Moreover, it is readily noticeable how
this rate of ination can be fairly well approximated by the ratio 400 (see Table 2). Thus, the
ratio of the annualized rate of discount (400) over the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity () provides a
very good approximation to the rate of ination that would minimize the mark-up in steady
state.7
Returning to the inuence of sticky prices in the sensitivity analysis, there is hardly any
inuence. Once  and  are set, the sticky-price specication (either á la Calvo or á la Taylor)
does not matter for the rate of ination that minimizes the mark-up. As reported in Table 2,
both the Calvo and Taylor pricing provide very similar numbers under any Q. There is just
one minor di¤erence. The Calvo pricing seems to give slightly higher rates of ination than the
Taylor one, especially when there is great price stickiness (see the cases with Q=8). However,
the di¤erence is quantitatively very small.
Summarizing, the Calvo and Taylor sticky-price specications have no inuence on the
determination of the rate of ination that minimizes the mark-up in steady state. This rate of
ination is a low positive gure, which is not determined by the price-adjustment scheme or the
degree of price stickiness. Rather, it is characterized by the model parameters  with a positive
inuence and  with a negative inuence.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have derived the steady-state relationship between the mark-up and the rate of
ination in a monopolistic competition model with two di¤erent sticky-price specications: the
Calvo pricing and the Taylor pricing. The minimal mark-up is obtained at a positive and low
rate of ination in both cases. Furthermore, its value is fairly well represented by 400 , which is
the ratio between the annual rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of a monopolistic
competition model.
Regarding the inuence of price stickiness, our results show that the rate of ination that
7The approximation is also very good with many other sensible calibrations of  and  which have been
examined, though they are not included in Table 2.
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minimizes the mark-up in steady state is nearly identical with the Calvo and Taylor pricing
behavior. Moreover, this result can be extended to say this rate of ination is nearly the same
for any extent of price rigidities (ranging from half a year to two years without price adjustment).
Therefore, neither the pricing scheme nor the level of price stickiness play any signicant role
in its determination.
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Table 1.Sticky prices and the rates of ination that minimize
the mark-up in steady state. Baseline calibration (=0.005, =10.0).
Sticky prices8 Rate of ination (annualized, %) that minimizes   1
Calvo pricing, (12) Taylor pricing, (13)
Q=2 0.201 0.199
Q=4 0.203 0.199
Q=8 0.206 0.199
Table 2. Sticky prices and the rates of ination that minimize
the mark-up in steady state. Sensitivity analysis.
=0.01, =10.0
Sticky prices Rate of ination (annualized, %) that minimizes   1 400
Calvo pricing, (12) Taylor pricing, (13)
Q=2 0.404 0.398 0.40
Q=4 0.411 0.398 0.40
Q=8 0.427 0.398 0.40
=0.005, =6.0
Sticky prices Rate of ination (annualized, %) that minimizes   1 400
Calvo pricing, (12) Taylor pricing, (13)
Q=2 0.335 0.332 0.33
Q=4 0.338 0.333 0.33
Q=8 0.343 0.333 0.33
=0.01, =6.0
Sticky prices Rate of ination (annualized, %) that minimizes   1 400
Calvo pricing, (12) Taylor pricing, (13)
Q=2 0.672 0.664 0.67
Q=4 0.684 0.664 0.67
Q=8 0.708 0.664 0.67
8Expected number of quarters without price adjustment (Q).
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Figure 1: Steady-state relationship between annualized percent ination () and the average
mark-up (  1). Baseline calibration,  = 0:005 and  = 10:0.
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